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ABSTRACT 
 
In finance, capital structure is the concept defining the way a corporation finances 
its total assets using two main capital sources: debt and equity. In other words, 
capital structure refers to the proportions of debt and equity that a firm employs to 
fund its operation. Acknowledging the capital structure’s benefits, researchers 
have observed and defined its determinants. Many elements have been proven to 
influence strongly the firm’s capital structure. However, it is noticeable that 
different industries have different strategies in capital budgeting. As many studies 
have tested and revealed conflicts, the validity of theoretical determinants needs to 
be examined further. 
This thesis aims to examine the validity of five chosen determinants selected by 
the author; namely, growth rate, firm’s size, profitability, liquidity and interest 
coverage capability, within the scope of Finnish technology firms. Particularly, 
the examination analyzes financial data from technology firms to either confirm or 
refute the assumptions of correlation between the selected determinants and 
capital structure. The firms which are listed in the technology sector index in 
OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange are selected as the object of the research. 
The thesis employs the quantitative research design, which is a combination of 
deductive approach, quantitative method and experimental research. The data was 
collected from both primary and secondary sources. The primary source is mainly 
the financial reports of 17 firms during the period of 2008 - 2012. Meanwhile, the 
secondary source is obtained from books and journals.  
The finding statistically confirms the positive relationship between the firm’s size 
and its capital structure. Furthermore, the negative relationships of the firm’s 
profitability and liquidity with capital structure are clarified. Meanwhile, the 
correlations of growth rate and interest coverage ratio with capital structure are 
insignificant. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 is designed to give an introduction to the topic of capital structure as 
well as the overview of the thesis. In particular, this chapter consists of five main 
parts. Firstly, Section 1.1 presents the background information of the thesis. 
Secondly, Section 1.2 introduces the objective of the thesis and the main research 
question. Thirdly, Section 1.3 discusses the thesis’s scope and limitation. Next, 
research methodology is described in Section 1.4. Finally, this chapter ends with 
Section 1.5 which provides the overall thesis structure. 
1.1 Background 
In finance, capital structure is a concept defining the way a corporation finances 
its total assets using two main capital sources: debt and equity. In other words, 
capital structure refers to the proportions of debt and equity that a firm employs. 
This theory was initially coined by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and it has 
inspired many researchers to further examine and develop the theory of capital 
structure (Ganguli, 2013). 
The main reason why capital structure decisions are significantly vital is that it 
helps minimize the firm’s weight average cost of capital (WACC) through 
adjusting the return rate of debt. As a result, it maximizes the wealth of 
shareholders. Glen and Pinto supported this theory by stating that the ratios of 
debt and equity play an essential part in firm’s financial decisions (Glen & Pinto 
1994). Furthermore, capital structure affects the firm’s profitability as well as its 
risk (Froot et al. 1993). A false vision about the capital structure may cause 
financial distress or worse bankruptcy as the company fails to cover the interest 
paid on debt. 
Acknowledging the capital structure’s benefits, many researchers have observed 
and defined its determinants (Booth et al. 2001; Kester 1986; Titman & Wessels 
1988). Fundamental elements such as growth rate, a firm’s size and taxes have 
been proven to influence strongly the firm’s capital structure. However, it is 
noticeable that different industries have different strategies in capital budgeting. 
As many studies have tested and revealed conflicting results (Harris & Raviv 
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1991, 290-336), the validity of theoretical determinants needs to be examined 
further. 
This thesis is designed to test the validity of five theoretical determinants, which 
are selected from different capital structure theories. In addition, the examination 
is employed in the context of the Finnish technology industry due to two reasons. 
First, the author is inspired by the rise of technology industry in Finland.  Second, 
there are still fewer studies examining the capital structure’s determinants in the 
technology industry.  
Several articles that share the same objective are Ganguli (2013), Eriotis (2007) 
and Karadeniz (2009) (Ganguli 2013; Eriotis et al. 2007; Karadeniz et al. 2009). 
For instance, Mouamer examines the validity of determinants particularly within 
public listed firms in Palestine (Mouamer, 2011). On the other hand, Karadeniz 
attempts to test the determinants’ relationships to capital structure in the extent of 
Turkish tourism industry (Karadeniz et al. 2009). In this research, the author 
adapts the frameworks from these articles and develops a feasible approach. In 
addition, the authot attempts to seek the confirmation of the correlation of the 
selected determinants with capital structure, particularly within the scope of the 
Finnish technology industry. 
1.2 Objective and Research Questions 
Previously, many studies have tested the relationships between the capital 
structure and its determinants. For example, Booth examined specifically the 
capital structure in the scope of developing countries (Booth et al. 2001), Wald 
analyzed on the worldwide scale (Wald 1999) , while,  Bevan and Danbolt tested 
in the context of United Kingdom firms (Bevan & Danbolt 2002). However, these 
studies concluded differently due to the selection of determinants’ measurement, 
the model employed and the time period implemented (Harris & Raviv 1991, 
336). Furthermore, the relationships between the capital structure and its 
determinants depend greatly on the background which firms are in. In other words  
the uniqueness of each market and each industry can alter noticably the ultimate 
conclusion. Therefore, this thesis focuses on examining the validity of selected 
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determinants of capital structure in a specific context, which is the Finnish 
technology industry. It attempts to either confirm or refute the theoretical 
assumptions of the relationships of the selected determinants with capital structure 
in the given condition. In short, the goal of the thesis is defined in the main 
research question below: 
 How Finnish technology firms’ characteristics affect their capital structure 
decisions? 
Unlike debt-free firms (unlevered firms), levered firms depend significantly on 
their capital structure decisions in many aspects, i.e., WACC, capital budgeting, 
riskiness and investments. Thus, it is crucial to firstly comprehend the importance 
of capital structure to the value of the company and secondly understand factors 
that can affect the capital structure decisions. Furthermore, the author desires to 
recount some fundamental theories of capital structure to provide a 
comprehensive reading to the audience. Therefore, three sub questions are 
addressed to explain the points above: 
o What are the principles of capital structure? 
o How capital structure affects a company’s value? 
o What are the factors that affect the capital structure decisions? 
Briefly, these questions have covered the objective of this thesis. The following 
parts of Chapter 1 will explain further the research methodology, scope and 
limitations, then finally, the thesis structure. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
In order to answer the main research question, formulating a proper research 
design is undoubtedly crucial. Researches have to explain the objectives indicated 
by the main research questions(s) and to define the sources for obtaining data as 
well as how to analyze collected data (Saunders et al. 2012, 159). In this section, 
the research design and the source for data collection will be presented. 
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In the first layer of the research design, the author implements a deductive 
approach. Unlike an inductive approach which starts by obtaining data to reveal 
the phenomenon or construct theory (Saunders et al. 2012, 144), the deductive 
approach proposes a testable hypothesis based on existing literature and tests them 
by collecting relevant data to measure the relationship and explain it. In addition, 
due to the nature of analyzing financial numerical data, the quantitative method is 
deemed the most relevant. Besides, the deductive approach is often combined with 
the quantitative method in the purpose of using data to test the theory (Saunders et 
al. 2012, 162). 
 
FIGURE 1. The thesis's research design (Source: Saunders et al. 2012, 160) 
 
Next, in the research strategy layer, since the author aims to examine how the 
change of determinants causes the change in capital structure, the experiment 
strategy is the most appropriate option. Experiment is a type of research strategy 
that focuses on observing a change of independent variable causing a change in 
dependent ones. The experimental study will confirm whether there is a 
significant relationship between two variables (Saunders et al. 2012, 174-175). 
Additionally, the author implements the archival research strategy since the data 
Deductive 
QUANTITATIVE 
METHOD 
EXPERIMENT & 
ARCHIVAL 
PRIMARY DATA 
& SECONDARY 
DATA 
Research Approach 
Research Method 
Research Strategy 
Sources & Analysis 
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collected will be mainly from annual published financial statements. The design 
of archival research is to deal with historical data (Saunders et al. 2012, 179). 
Lastly, in the choice of data collection, the thesis combines the mix of primary 
and secondary sources to construct both theoretical and empirical parts. The 
theoretical section mainly consists of existing literature from books, journals and 
articles related to capital structure. Meanwhile, the empirical part collects data 
from the company’s annual reports or financial statements. 
To sum up, Figure 1 illustrates the proposed research design. The thesis adapts the 
quantitative research design, which implements the deductive approach and 
quantitative analysis method (Saunders et al. 2012, 162). Additionally, this design 
defines the experimental nature of the thesis and suggests an observation through 
historical primary data to explain the main research objective. Since the primary 
data is a collection of financial figures, it needs to be transformed into analytical 
data. Therefore, later in Chapter 4, the methodology of data analysis, variable 
measurement and the estimate model will be explained in detail. 
1.4 Scope and Limitations 
Firstly, the main concern of this thesis is to examine the validity of theoretical 
determinants to capital structure decisions in Finnish technology firms. However, 
the numbers of determinants and theories are huge. As the result, within the scope 
of a bachelor’s thesis, only a few chosen capital structure’s theories and 
determinants are addressed and examined to secure the coherence and conciseness 
to the thesis’s topic. 
Secondly, the requirement to select determinants is based on the availability of 
financial data and the managerial controllability. Thus, this thesis only concerns 
factors which are financially controllable and can be derived from financial 
statements of target firms. Other uncontrollable or incomputable factors are only 
introduced in short and are excluded from the analysis. Additionally, it implies 
that the thesis only gives the viewpoint of an investor since only published 
financial data are analyzed and internal information is inaccessible. 
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Thirdly, in terms of data analysis, there are limitations in the data sample. 
Although the Finnish technology industry is thriving, only 17 listed companies 
with accessible data are investigated. Thus, the drawback of a small sample might 
lead to the incapability of deducing a significant conclusion.  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
At first, the thesis starts with the introduction which conveys the author’s intent, 
the objective of the thesis as well as the research design. It is followed by the 
theoretical part which consists of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  
Chapter 2 covers all the selected principles of capital structure and explains along 
the importance of capital structure decisions to the company’s valuation. Then, 
chapter 3 continues by presenting some chosen significant determinants of capital 
structure which are confirmed by different theoretical and empirical studies. 
Furthermore, it reveals the difference in the conclusions of previous studies of 
these determinants’ relationships to capital structure. As shall be mentioned, the 
validity of theoretical determinants varies depending on many aspects. 
It is followed by Chapter 4, which focuses on presenting in detail the data input 
process and data analysis methodology. In particular, Chapter 4 firstly illustrates 
the measurement methods for the variable and how obtained data is transformed 
into variable’s data. Secondly, hypotheses of the correlations between the 
determinants and capital structure are constructed. These assumptions are created 
based on discussions of the previous chapters. Thirdly, the estimate model is 
established in order to analyze the data, test the hypotheses and give the 
conclusion. 
Next, Chapter 5 provides an empirical research which examines the influence of 
the chosen determinants on the firm’s capital structure in the context of the 
Finnish technology industry. First, it describes OMX Helsinki Technology sector 
which is an index of 17 listed Finnish technology firms. This index acts as the 
database for the analysis. Second, the author demonstrates how the data input 
process is conducted, particularly, how firm financial data is transformed into 
variable data using methods introduced in Chapter 4. Third, Chapter 5 explains 
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the results after analyzing the database using the estimate model and gives the 
answer for the main research question.  
 
FIGURE 2. The thesis’s structure 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, explains the reliability as well as the 
validity of the thesis, and proposes some recommendations for further research. In 
short, the thesis’s structure is illustrated in Figure 2 above. 
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2 PRINCIPLES OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
A company needs capital in order to maintain or expand its business. Broadly 
speaking, there are two ways of financing: by using debt or equity capital. Debt-
financing has many advantages: firstly, interest paid on debt is tax deductible, 
while, dividends paid on stocks are not. Additionally, these payments are 
relatively fixed during the maturity, unlike dividends which alter depending on 
firm’s profitability. Secondly, as shall be mentioned, debt capital creates leverage, 
which can boost up firm’s earnings and stock value. Lastly, Jense and Meckling 
prove that debt has some benefits in firm’s management (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). 
However, debt capital is considered as a double-edged sword since an increase in 
debt means an increase in firm’s risk and financial distress. First, although interest 
is tax deductible, if a firm cannot cover the interest payments, the stockholders 
will have to compensate the unsettled amount or that firm will go bankrupt. 
Second, debt can amplify the loss if a debt-financed firm performs poorly. Third, 
funding with debt implies that firms have to bear the cost of financial distress, 
agency costs and financial risks. Therefore, debt management has been a crucial 
task for every company who aims to optimize the benefits of debt capital and 
minimize the risk it might bring (Brigham & Houston 2007, 416-420). 
In 1958, a theorem of capital structure was devised by Franco Modigliani and 
Merton Miller (Modigliani & Miller 1958). This theorem, also called MM 
theorem, lately has become the foundation of modern capital structure and 
corporate finance theories. It states that, in a perfect market context, the firm’s 
value is not affected by how a firm finances. Thus, the firm’s capital structure 
decisions are irrelevant to the firm’s value. (Brealey et al. 2011, 420-427.) 
Many studies revealed several unrealistic assumptions in MM theorem. Some 
significantly are the omissions of taxes, costs of financial distress and asymmetric 
information (Brigham & Houston 2007, 435-440). Taxation has a crucial impact 
on financial leverage as interest becomes a tax shield for companies (Graham 
2000). Meanwhile, financial distress, i.e., bankruptcy costs and agency costs 
(Jensen 1986), reduces the firm’s value. Furthermore, asymmetric information 
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happens in daily life since the managers always comprehend the company better 
than investors (Meyers & Majluf 1984; Myers 1984). These flaws of MM theorem 
have proved the fact that capital structure is relevant to the firm’s value and it 
encourages researchers to examine practically further how to employ a feasible 
capital structure to optimize the firm’s value. 
Chapter 2 aims to illustrate the principles of capital structure and its relationship 
to the value of the company. At first, Section 2.1 introduces the concept of 
optimal capital structure, a mix of debt and equity that maximizes the firm’s 
value. Moreover, this section addresses the relationship between capital structure 
and firm’s weight average cost of capital. Then, Section 2.2 explains the trade-off 
between risk and return when funding with debt. It includes business risk, 
financial risk, and two leverages, namely, operating and financial leverage. These 
two sections serve as the foundation for capital structure. Subsequent parts from 
2.3 to 2.6 further clarify the relationship between capital structure and firm’s 
operation through describing the flaws of MM theorem, which are taxation, the 
cost of financial distress and asymmetric information. Nonetheless, with the 
principles of capital structure, Chapter 2 provides clues to identify determinants of 
capital structure, which lately are explained in the next chapter. 
2.1 Optimal Capital Structure 
Optimal capital structure indicates a firm’s projected mix of debt and equity that 
maximizes its value. Each firm generally measures their optimal capital structure 
and adjusts the debt ratio either by changing the proportions of debt or equity 
(Brigham & Houston 2007 417-418). Additionally, optimal capital structure 
changes over time since it depends on firm characteristics, managerial attitude and 
many other external factors. In practice, managers set optimal capital structure as 
a range, i.e. 40-50% rather than just a fixed number. (Brealey et al. 2011, 437.) 
Statistically, a firm’s debt ratio or debt leverage can be illustrated as below. 
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Optimal structure varies from firm to firm and industry to industry. In capital-
intensive business such as mining, steel or chemicals; firms prefer capitalizing by 
debt. Similarly, real-estate companies, airlines and banks depend heavily on debt-
financing (Brigham & Houston 2007, 440). Thus, these firms tend to implement a 
high level of debt ratio. In contrast, knowledge-intensive firms like 
pharmaceutical and computer companies manage operating with relatively small 
proportion of debt (Brigham & Houston 2007, 446). That is, they aim to keep 
their debt ratio at a low degree. Statistically, Table 1 illustrates the variation of 
debt policy in several industries. 
 
TABLE 1. Capital structure percentages, 2005 - Six American industries ranked       
by common equity ratio (source: Brigham  & Houston 2007, 444) 
 
 
Industry Common Equity Ratio Long-term debt Ratio 
 
Pharmaceuticals 
Computers 
Steel 
Aerospace 
Railroads 
Utilities 
 
80.65% 
76.34% 
67.57% 
64.10% 
59.17% 
40.65% 
 
19.35% 
23.66% 
32.43% 
35.9% 
40.83% 
59.35% 
 
As noted earlier, achieving optimal capital structure can help maximize the firm’s 
value. Theoretically, because managers aim to minimize the overall cost of capital 
(WACC), they try to adjust the capital structure (Brealey et al. 2011, 429). These 
two actions would later lead to the maximization of the firm value. To illustrate 
more clearly the relationship between WACC and the firm’s value, WACC’s 
definition and its importance will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Regardless the capital sources, firms are always obligated to pay the cost of 
capital, i.e., interest paid on bonds or dividends paid on common stocks. Thus, in 
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a long-run valuation process, the weighted average cost of capital or WACC was 
coined to calculate the firm’s overall cost of capital. Practically, WACC is an 
essential investment tool for both investors and managers. In the viewpoint of 
investors, WACC indicates the minimum rate of return that a firm must earn to 
satisfy its investors (Stewart 1991, 431). In particular, if a firm earns less than its 
WACC, it implies that the firm is performing poorly and consequently the 
investments would flow elsewhere (Mäkeläinen & Roztocki 1988, 10). Secondly, 
managers employ WACC as a useful indicator to see if firm’s future projects and 
capital budgeting strategies are worthy to undertake (Stewart 1991, 430-432). Last 
but not least, WACC plays a critical role in corporate valuation. In the widely 
used free cash flow discounted evaluation model, financial analysts practically 
employ WACC as a discounted rate (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels 2000, 47). As 
the result, firms always aim to minimize the overall cost of capital to reduce the 
capital expenses, improve the firm’s attractiveness towards investors, and partly 
increase the firm’s value. 
To illustrate how capital structure can adjust WACC, the following formula of 
after-tax WACC with the absence of preferred stock is given below (Brigham & 
Daves 2007, 336). 
     
 
   
        
 
   
   
According to the equation, WACC consists of two main components: after tax 
cost of debt rd times the firm’s debt over total assets, and, cost of common equity 
rs times the firm’s equity over firm total assets. Obviously, the debt ratio affects 
WACC in two ways: firstly, the change of interest payment interest can alter the 
result of WACC and secondly, the adjustment in the debt-over-equity ratio can 
affect WACC.  
Since firms always want to minimize the overall cost of capital, the amount of 
debt and the interest rate play a vital role in identifying the best result. Therefore, 
adjusting these two factors can help firms to achieve their optimal capital 
structure. (Brigham & Houston 2007, 431.)  
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2.2 Risk and Leverage 
Among all external capital sources, debt is one of the firm’s most favorite funds 
due to many advantages. First of all, debt is generally cheaper than equity due to 
two reasons: loans are secured by the firm’s assets and interest paid on debt is tax 
deductible. Additionally, interest rate paid for debt investors partly remains fixed 
until the maturity time, i.e. bond interest payment. Second, debt investors have the 
priority to claim the firm’s cash flow or liquidation before shareholders receive 
any money. Third, unlike shareholders, debt holders do not have the voting right 
unless the firm violates the debt agreements. (Brealey et al. 2011, 331-333.) 
However, borrowing more debt also increases the default risk, which practically 
indicates the probability that the borrower will not pay the scheduled interest 
payments or principals. For instance, if a firm failed to pay the interest, the debt 
investors could force the firm to go bankrupt, claim its assets or even take over its 
management. In that case, stockholders would lose all the investments (Brealey et 
al. 2011, 350). Therefore, when the firm is financed by debt, it increases the 
riskiness the stockholders bear. 
Nonetheless, stockholders, who have the control in firm’s management, accept 
this aspect. As discussed in the Section 2.1, setting the optimal capital structure, 
which involves debt financing, maximizes the firm’s return earning as well as 
stock price, hence, it benefits stockholders the most. As the result, optimal capital 
structure also involves in identifying the balance between risk and return, which 
also peaks the firm’s stock price. 
The next two sub parts, Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 discuss further this tradeoff 
between risk and return by recounting two main components of risk in 
corporation’s viewpoint: business risk, the inherent risk of the firm,  and financial 
risk, the risk-cost for debt financing. Furthermore, they explain the two leverages: 
operating and financial leverages, and how they affect the return of the company 
when implementing debt financing. 
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2.2.1 Business Risk 
Business risk refers to the risk that affects the operation of the firm, causing the 
uncertainty to its profitability (Brigham & Houston 2007, 432). It consists of two 
main types of risk: unique risk and systematic risk. Firstly, unique risk, sometimes 
called unsystematic risk, is the risk that only the firm and, probably its 
competitors, are prone to (Brealey et al. 2011, 162). For instance, an airline might 
expose to aircraft crash, weather hazards, and low-cost competitors. Such 
unfavorable internal events can hinder the firm’s operation, thus, indirectly hurt its 
profitability. Secondly, systematic risk, or market risk, is perils that exists in 
economy’s scope, and threaten all firms and industries (Brealey et al. 2011, 162). 
Significant examples can be recession, war and unstable exchange rate. In reality, 
business risk differs depending on firm’s characteristics, industry’s features and 
market behaviors (Brigham & Houston 2007, 439). 
Business risk is crucial in the way that it represents the entire firm’s risk when the 
firm is debt-free (Brigham & Houston 2007, 419). This point can be 
mathematically illustrated through the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
equation for calculating the cost of equity (Sharpe 1964). 
               
In CAPM approach, the cost of equity rs equals to the basic risk-free rate rRF plus 
risk premium of the market, RPM times the beta of the firm’s stock, bi. In the 
unlevered situation, the beta reflects the level of the firm’s business risk. Since rRF 
and RPM are two uncontrollable market factors, cost of equity depends only on the 
firm’s beta. (Sharpe 1964.) Recalled from the WACC equation, if the firm is debt-
free, then WACC equals to rs. Thus, the level of business risk determines the 
unlevered cost of capital or expected return, from the investor’s viewpoint. As 
capital structure decisions aim to minimize WACC, this inherent risk plays a 
crucial part in how firms set a target capital structure. 
In practice, business risk depends on the firm’s characteristics such as operating 
leverage, demand, sales price, cost of goods sold and managerial flexibility. For 
instance, if the firm’s demand remains constant, it can operate optimally, thus, 
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less risky. Meanwhile, frequent change in input cost increases the firm’s business 
risk since it cannot react quickly by raising the sales price. Besides, the firm’s 
characteristics are partly determined by industry and also market’s characteristics. 
Some of them are unsystematic while few are controllable to some degree by 
management. (Brigham & Houston 2007, 440-442.) 
In conclusion, business risk reflects the inherent riskiness of the firm based on the 
firm’s unique characteristics. Also, the investor’s required rate of return and 
WACC are determined significantly by this risk. Therefore, setting optimal capital 
structure decisions should involve measuring business risk and its determinants. 
Out of all factors, the author will discuss further about operating leverage at sub-
section 2.1.1 since this leverage relates to the firm’s fix costs, a vital factor 
contributing significantly to the firm’s business risk. 
2.2.1.1 Operating Leverage 
The higher fixed costs a firm carries, the higher business risk they have (Brigham 
& Houston 2007, 421). Furthermore, fixed costs remain relatively unchanged 
regardless of the firm’s performance. Therefore, when a firm carries a large 
amount of fixed costs, while other factors remain stable, a small change in net 
sales will have a noticeable effect on net profits (Grunewald & Nemmers 1970, 
76). Additionally, high fixed costs and low variable costs can alter greatly the 
firm’s earning power both upwards and downwards (Weston & F.Brigham 1969, 
86). 
Operating leverage refers to the level of fixed costs in the firm. The higher 
percentage the total cost is fixed, the higher degree of operating leverage is 
(Archer & D'Ambrosio 1972, 421). Particularly, the degree of operating leverage 
(DOL) measures the effect of fixed costs on the firm’s profit as DOL equals to 
fixed costs divided by operating profit (Block & Hirt 1977, 116). Similarly, the 
equation calculating DOL can also be illustrated as the division of percentage 
change in earnings before taxes and interest over percentage change in sales. 
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For instance, if DOL is 1.5, then 100% increase in sales means 150% boost in 
EBIT. However, a 100% loss in sales also decreases EBIT by 150%. Therefore, 
high DOL means both higher profit and higher risk at the same time. 
In practice, operating leverage depends largely on technology. For examples, 
nuclear plants require high fixed costs; however, they would have low variable 
costs. On the other hand, thermoelectric plants might require low fixed costs, but 
then, they would have high variable costs. Furthermore, industries such as steel, 
chemical, auto manufacturing obviously must invest mostly in fixed assets, thus 
they always carry high fixed costs and high operating leverage. Meanwhile, 
service business such as consulting and accounting has relatively lower fixed 
costs, therefore, lower operating leverage than. (Brigham & Houston 2007, 424.) 
In short, establishing an appropriate operating leverage involves measuring the 
tradeoff between risk and return. As operating leverage reflects partly firm’s 
business risk level as well as its operating nature, capital structure decisions 
depends heavily on decisions on setting the level of operating leverage. 
2.2.2 Financial Risk 
Unlike business risk that appears as a firm starts operating, financial risk is an 
additional risk that stockholders must carry whenever a firm finances by debt. 
With the use of debt, the stockholders bear financial risks in the way that, the 
debtholders get paid first before the stockholders receive anything, particularly in 
the bankruptcy situation. The higher the debt ratio is, the more the financial risk 
exists. Meanwhile, the stockholders still have to carry the basic business risk 
while the debtholders do not. (Brigham & Houston 2007, 423-425.) The Hamada 
equation proves mathematically the existence of financial risk (Hamada 1969, 26-
28). 
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In the equation, bL indicates the levered beta of the firm or the beta when the firm 
uses debt, while bU is unlevered beta or the firm’s business risk. If the firm starts 
capitalizing by debt, it increases the unlevered beta of the firm by [1 + (1 – T) 
(D/E)], which represents the additional risk, or financial risk. 
Despite this fact, the stockholders accept the increased risk as the tradeoff 
between risk and return. As the result, their required rate of return rises to match 
the risk they carry. Modigliani and Miller’s proposition 2 (MM2) states that the 
shareholder’s required rate of return increases when the firm’s debt-equity ratio 
increases (Miller 1988, 14-20). This tradeoff phenomenon is illustrated in the 
below equation (Brealey et al. 2011, 425). 
             
 
 
 
Recalling the previous WACC discussion, the average cost of capital is also the 
minimum required rate of return in the viewpoint of investors or rA in equation X. 
In the scenario of debt-free firms, rE equals to rA because D is at zero, indicating a 
pure required return for business risk. Meanwhile, if a firm is levered, rE is 
calculated differently in equation X. Since financial risk matters, stockholders 
demand extra returns as compensation, which represents as        
 
 
 .Also, if 
a firm finances more debt, the debt-over-equity ratio 
 
 
 increases, thus, it raises the 
amount of extra return. (Brealey et al. 2011, 425-427.) 
The high degree of financial risk amplifies the expected rate of return for the 
stockholder’s investments. However, it increases the overall riskiness for 
stockholders. That is the tradeoff between risk and return, leaving stockholders no 
worse or better. (Modigliani and Miller 1958.)  Similarly to business risk, seeking 
the balance of how much financial risk firms should carry to trade for higher 
profitability is crucial for capital structure. The next Section 2.2.2.1 explains 
further about this tradeoff by introducing financial leverage concept. 
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2.2.2.1 Financial Leverage 
Financial leverage indicates the level of debt financing over the total capital 
structure of the firm. Due to the fact that the firm has a fixed obligation of interest 
paid on debt, it increases the chance of greatly magnifying the firm’s results in 
different situations. (Block & Hirt 1977, 116.) The degree of financial leverage 
(DFL) is expressed as the percentage change in earnings per share (EPS) over the 
percentage change in earnings before taxes and interest (EBIT). The DFL 
equation is addressed as below: 
     
               
                
 
For example, if DFL is 1.73, it indicates that if EBIT increases 100%, then EPS 
will correspondingly increase 173%. Also, if EBIT decreases 100%, then EPS will 
suffer from a loss of 173%. This equation is a clear explanation for the tradeoff 
between financial risk and expected return. Financial leverage boost expected EPS 
until a certain threshold; however, it also increases risk to offset the benefit 
(Brigham & Houston 2007, 428). 
Shortly, financial risk brings both positive and negative effects. While it 
magnifies the range of EPS, it adds up more risk into the firm. Thus, inaccurate 
debt ratio might cause a fruitless financial leverage; hence, it hurts the firm’s 
assets. Therefore, determining optimal capital structure requires balancing both 
effects of this leverage in order to maximize the firm’s value, particularly, the 
firm’s stock price. 
2.3 The Taxation Effect 
As mentioned earlier, financing with debt creates a tax shield benefits to levered 
firms. Interest paid on debt is a tax-deductible expense. Recalling the equations of 
WACC and Hamada in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.2, tax shield benefits are illustrated 
in the form of      , where T represents for the percentage of corporate tax. For 
example, assuming a Finnish firm borrows $1 million of debt and the corporate 
tax is 20% statutory rate (Vero, 2014), the net liability that the firm bears is only 
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.80 million since                          . Additionally, the tax benefits 
from larger amounts, i.e., $20 million or $50 million increase proportionally. 
(Myers 2001, 82-91.)  
However, firms do not always perform well. Hence, the average effective future 
tax rate can be lower than the statutory rate (Myers 2001, 87). Furthermore, tax 
benefits of debt can be cancelled out by the tax advantage of equity. Income from 
stocks comes from two sources: dividends and capital gains, which are treated 
separately. Individual investors can defer capital gains and later pay taxes at lower 
capital gains percentage. In addition, there are some favorable tax treatments of 
income from stocks. (Brigham & Houston 2007, 436-437.) 
Miller proposed the equilibrium where effects of personal and corporate taxes 
offset each other (Miller 1977, 4-6). While firms favor the use of debt due to the 
deductibility of interest, the favorable tax treatment of income from stocks 
decreases the expected rate of return on stocks. Thus, it is difficult to measure net 
effects of these two factors. Nonetheless, many researchers observe and believe 
that interest deductibility is relatively stronger; therefore, overall, the use of debt 
is more preferred. (Brigham & Houston 2007, 437.) 
Nevertheless, the interest tax shields do increase the value of the firm. In fact, 
Graham measures the gains from capitalizing with debt and concludes that tax 
benefits can be up to 7% of the average firm’s value (Graham 2000, 3). 
Specifically, if a debt-free firm uses debt to a certain level, its overall value would 
increase about 7%. 
However, there should be some costs to offset the tax benefits; otherwise, firms 
would shield as much taxable income as possible. This leads to the development 
of the tradeoff theory and costs of financial distress which offset the interest tax 
shelters. 
2.4 Threat of Financial Distress 
Debt financing always comes along with financial distress. This distress exists 
when there is a probability that agreements with creditors are violated or fulfilled 
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with difficulty (Brealey et al. 2011, 447). Differently, financial distress can be 
clarified as a low cash flow situation in which the firm suffers losses but still is 
able to pay interest (Amiyatosh 2008). Besides, the cost of financial distress is 
significantly expensive and it depends on the probability of distress and the 
magnitude of financial distress.  Specifically, the firm’s valuation consists of three 
parts, which are illustrated in the equation below (Brealey et al. 2011, 447). 
      
       
 
      
            
 
  
            
 
              
                   
 
A levered firm’s value increases since interest paid on debt is tax-deductible, 
which is reflected by the present value (PV) of tax shield. Meanwhile, cost of 
financial distress created by debt capital reduces the overall value of the firm. 
Therefore, there is a need to choose the debt ratio that optimizes this tradeoff 
between cost of financial distress and tax shelter benefit. This led to the 
development of the trade-off theory - a capital structure model which indicates 
that firms use tax shields of debt financing to offset the problems caused by 
financial distress (Brigham & Houston 2007, 438).  
As mentioned above, financial distress exists and is quite costly to companies. It 
can be the costs of bankruptcy or reorganization (Myers 1977, 2), or agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976) which occur when the company’s credit ranking 
decreases. In the manager’s viewpoint, financial distress is costly due to three 
main reasons. Firstly, high financial distress level may drive away important 
suppliers, key employees and lose the customers. Also, financially distressed 
firms might lose remarkable market shares to their healthy competitors as well as 
their competitive positions. Secondly, these firms might be forced to forgo 
lucrative investments or abandon on-going projects. (Amiyatosh 2008, 2.) 
Thirdly, firms always face the threat of bankruptcy (Brigham & Houston 2007, 
436- 438). It is costly due to the fact that, in liquidation process, the firm’s assets 
will be liquidated less than their actual value. Therefore, optimal debt ratio 
implies a trade-off between tax benefits of debt and the costs of bankruptcy. 
Obviously, the higher business risk a firm has, the higher financial distress, 
particularly bankruptcy cost, it carries. If the firm has an unstable profit or 
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demand, it faces a greater chance of bankruptcy. Therefore, less debt should be 
used (Brigham & Houston 2007, 438). Furthermore, assets structure can 
determine the level of financial distress. For instance, the loss in intangible assets 
like brand image, human capital, technology are much more critical in some 
industries. Additionally, illiquid fixed assets can add up the cost of financial 
distress to the firm (Brealey et al. 2011, 458). Therefore, firms with safe, tangible 
assets and high level of stable, tax-deductible income can rely on debt financing, 
while, unprofitable firms has strong volatile profits and risky, intangible assets 
should finance with equity (Brealey et al. 2011, 457-459). To illustrate more 
clearly the relationship between the firm’s value with its financial distress, the 
trade-off theory is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
According to Myers, trade-off theory states that a firm increases its debt ratio to 
the level where likely the costs of financial distress neutralize the benefit of tax 
shields (Myers 1984, 3-7). That is, optimal capital structure represents the 
equilibrium between positive effect (tax advantages) and debt’s drawbacks (costs 
of financial distress). Therefore, this theory basically focuses on two main aspects 
of capital structure: tax shield benefit and financial distress cost. 
Graphically, Figure 3 illustrates this trade-off theory. Initially, the firm’s value 
starts at V0, the firm’s full-equity-financed value. As the firm’s assets are 
capitalized by debt, the value is boosted by tax shelter benefits. Hence, the firm’s 
value continuously increases along with the increase of leverage (the red line). 
However, at D1, the threshold that the costs of financial distress become 
materialized, the firm’s value, now illustrated by the green line, grows more 
slowly. As noted earlier, the higher level of debt, the more significant the costs of 
financial distress. As the result, the firm’s value starts falling after peaking at D2, 
the optimal leverage, due to the fact that, the net change in the costs of financial 
distress exceeds that of the tax benefits. Although debt can be quite advantageous 
at low levels due to insignificant costs and effective tax shield, a large proportion 
of debt can cause companies to financially struggle with obliged interest payment 
(Stretcher & Johnson 2011, 2-6). At worst, the firm’s value can drop lower than 
the initial unlevered value. 
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Theoretically, trade-off theory suggests that the optimal capital structure is the 
equilibrium D2, where the firm’s value reaches its peak. Also, the range between 
D1 and D2 is considered as the acceptable range for capital structure decision 
(Brigham & Houston 2007, 438). It is advisable that Figure 3 is purely 
approximation, thus, it is merely for illustrative purpose.  
 
FIGURE 3. Trade off Theory - The Effect of Leverage on the Value  
(Source: Brigham &  Houston 2007, 438) 
 
In practice, firms can ignore the optimal ratio and maintain their debt ratio 
consistently to achieve a specific bond rating (Graham & Harvey 2001, 41). Many 
previous studies provide empirical evidence supporting the trade-off theory and 
the positive relationship between capital structure and firm performance such as 
Champion (1999), Hadlock and James (2002) (Ebaid 2009; Hadlock & James 
2002) 
However, although trade-off theory explains well the relationship between tax 
shelter and financial distress as well as the optimal structure model, it still has 
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some debatable points. Firstly, the tradeoff cannot explain the relationship 
between high profit and low debt ratios. In fact, the most lucrative firms generally 
have low debt ratio, such as Microsoft, Google and Intel which is in contrast with 
the trade-off theory. Secondly, the present value of interest tax shelters is hardly 
detected in Fama and French’s study (1998). (Myer 2001.)Thirdly, in Lemmon’s 
study, the trade-off theory fails to explain the difference of debt ratio between 
firms in the same industry while all the theory’s critical factors are relatively 
controlled (Lemmon et al. 2008). Therefore, it led to the development of other 
theories, which are discussed in the subsequent sections. 
2.5 Asymmetric Information 
In practice, there are a number of long established, successful firms with stable 
high profit which seldom take debt financing (Ganguli 2013). As the result, Myers 
and  Majluf have developed a capital structure theory called “pecking order” to 
explain this issue above (Myers 1984; Meyers & Majluf 1984). The theory 
emphasizes the role of asymmetric information in the firm’s operation. It assumes 
that managers work to benefit the shareholder’s wealth. 
Asymmetric information implies that, generally, managers have more information 
about the firm’s operation, risks and prospect than the outside investors (Ganguli 
2013). Since the outside investors or the market are lack of information, therefore, 
they may undervalue the firm’s new shares relative to the intrinsic value measured 
by managers who understand the whole picture of the firm’s operation (Ebaid 
2009). Hence, issuing more equity likely hurts the current value of existing firm’s 
stocks due to the transfer of value between new and old stockholders. Therefore, 
when capitalizing, managers will avoid equity capital from stock and select, 
firstly, internal sources, i.e., retained earnings, then secondly, external source i.e. 
debt. (Myers 1984, 9-12.) 
On the one hand, the pecking order implies that firms only issue new shares at an 
overpriced value relative to the current stock price. Thus, issuing new shares 
signals the overpricing equity and more importantly, that firm is not confident 
enough to be financed by debt. Therefore, according to pecking order theory, issue 
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of shares means “bad news” in investor’s viewpoint. On the other hand, if a firm 
is willing to use debt capital, it signals a healthy operation with confident future. 
(Myers 1984) As the result, debt is commonly favored than shares in financing 
decision. However, as mentioned above, debt adds more risks to the firm, 
meanwhile; profitable firms generate high retained earning which is considered 
the safest internal source. Thus, profitable firms prioritize retained earnings, then 
debt capital until it reaches the firm’s debt capacity, and finally new equity 
(Myers & Majluf 1984). Rajan and Zingales approve the negative relationship 
between profitability and capital structure, indicating that profitable firms use 
retain earnings and certainly, less debt (Rajan & Zingales 1995). Other 
noteworthy studies also conclude the results which favor the pecking order theory 
(Friend & Lang 1988; Titman & Wessels 1988; Kester 1986). 
Nevertheless, like other theories, pecking order has weaknesses. Since it is based 
on an assumption that managers aim to maximize shareholder’s value, it does not 
explains manager’s actual behaviors, i.e., why managers should worry about the 
underpricing or overpricing of new stock issue. Furthermore, it cannot address the 
situations where manager’s superior information causes financing issues. 
Therefore, when the interests of managers and stockholders are not the same, it 
leads to another issue in the firm’s financial management. (Brealey et al. 2011,  
463-464.) This will be discussed further in the next section.  
In conclusion, pecking order theory suggests that asymmetric information affects 
the firm’s choice in capital financing. Moreover, it explains why firms with high 
profitable operation tend to have low debt ratio and how external source like debt 
is “better” than common stock (Brealey et al. 2011,  461-464). Thus, firms should 
reserve its borrowing capacity for future investment opportunities if necessary. 
Through this theory, some determinants are identified. 
2.6 Agency Costs 
As mentioned earlier, agency costs contribute to the firm’s financial distress. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) initiated a theory approving that capital structure is 
determined by agency costs due to the conflicts of interest (Harris & Raviv 1991). 
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In their research, they pointed out two kinds of conflicts: firstly, conflicts between 
shareholders and managers and secondly, conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
Conflicts between shareholders and managers occur as the consequence of 
different objectives between them (Brigham & Houston 2007, 440). When the 
firm has excessive finance to support its operation, managers often use the excess 
cash to invest in their personal benefits, e.g., by pursuing favorable projects, 
purchasing luxurious goods (Harris & Raviv 1991). It is due to the fact that, 
managers are unable to gain 100% of the residual claim from their profit 
generating activities, but still, have to carry the whole cost of the firm’s operation 
(Jensen 1986). 
The conflict can be mitigated in two ways. The first method is to distribute some 
of its cash flow to shareholders though raising dividends or repurchasing existing 
stock. By that, it limits the wasteful expenditures that managers are likely to 
make. The second way to reduce the “free” cash available to managers is debt 
financing. By using leverage buyout (LBO), the firm uses debt to repurchase a 
high proportion of the firm’s shares. It helps the firm increase the manager’s 
equity share as well as force managers to pay interest payments. (Brigham & 
Houston 2007, 448.) Therefore, it decreases the “free” cash available to managers. 
Another benefit of debt financing is introduced by Grossman and Hart (1982). 
Debt financing means threat of bankruptcy increasing, therefore, it forces 
managers to work harder, waste less perquisites and make better investment 
decisions. Otherwise, they will lose benefits, reputation, and at worst, their jobs 
due to the threat of bankruptcy (Grossman & Hart 1982). 
Another point in Jensen and Meckling’s study is conflicts between debtholders 
and equityholders. These two parties have different relationships to the firm in 
terms of financial expected returns and voting right. The nature of debt is fixed 
interest payments and maturity date, when debt, i.e. bond gets redeemed, while 
common stock’s nature depends on the firm’s dividend policy and it can be sold at 
any time. Regardless of the firm’s profit, the debtholders always stay at the safer 
side, while the stockholders gain more if investments go well or nothing if the 
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firm performs poorly. Therefore, stockholders tend to invest in riskier projects to 
capture more returns and growth opportunities. On the contrary, the debtholders 
favor projects which can secure their investments. However, the problem is, the 
stockholders have the right to vote, while the debtholders do not. Therefore, 
debtholders may create debt contracts which potentially limit the firm’s 
management to take risky investments or demand more returns to raise overall 
cost of capital. It implies that, the equityholders bear this agency cost to 
debtholders to have an incentive to invest sub-optimally. (Harris & Raviv 1991) 
As the result, obtaining optimal capital structure means trading off the agency cost 
of debt against debt’s benefit (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Additionally, some 
implications are stated. Firstly, capital structure may depend on debt contract 
requirements such as interest coverage capability, prohibition against new 
investments, etc. Secondly, the more limited debt contracts, the higher debt levels. 
Hence, firms with fewer growth opportunities tend to carry higher level of 
leverage. Lastly, firms with excessive “free” cash and optimal growth rate should 
increase debt to reduce wasteful consumption and to keep managers in line. 
(Harris & Raviv 1991) 
Nevertheless, Chapter 2 gives many clues to identify determinants of capital 
structure, for example, fixed costs, profitability and the firm’s size. In the next 
Chapter 3, the author further discusses the determinants of capital structure. As 
shall be seen, many firm’s characteristics are involved in the process of deciding 
the firm’s capital structure. 
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3 DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Factors influencing capital structure decisions can be divided into three main 
categories. Firstly, such determinants like economy stability, exchange rate, 
political restriction and exchange offers can be listed as market factors. 
Commonly, they affect the whole market, i.e., Taggart (1985) finds that leverage 
has gradually gone up since the World War II, implying that such events could 
change the capital structure trend of the market. Similarly, Marsh (1982) 
concludes that market conditions have a huge impact in the firm’s debt financing 
decisions. (Harris & Raviv 1991, 36-41.) .  
The second category includes elements in corporate control. Several studies such 
as DeAngelo (1985), Dann and DeAngelo (1988)  and Amihud (1990) approved 
that capital structure could be influenced by corporate control (Harris & Raviv 
1991, 36-37). Some empirical works indicate a relationship between capital 
structure and managerial ownership such as Kim and Sorensen (1986),  Friend and 
Lang (1988)  and Gonedes (1988). (Harris & Raviv 1991, 36-41.) Also, 
managerial attitudes, i.e., aggressive or conservative, can affect the capital 
structure decisions (Brigham & Houston 2007, 442).  
The third category, which is also the theme of Chapter 3, consists of the 
determinants defined as the firm’s characteristics. Several studies identified some 
specific features of firms and industries such as the determinants and also their 
correlations with capital structure, namely, Bradley (1984), Castanias (1983), 
Long and Malitz (1985), Kester (1986), Marsh (1982), and , Titman and Wessels 
(1988) (Harris & Raviv 1991, 36-41). Briefly, observers concluded that the debt 
ratio increased with fixed assets, non-debt tax shelters, growth rate and firm size, 
while, decreased with volatility, expenses in research and development or 
advertising, threat of bankruptcy, product’s uniqueness (Harris & Raviv 1991, 38-
39). As there are many internal factors of which information is unavailable, 
Chapter 3 only focuses on explaining some financial elements which can be 
deduced from the firm’s historical financial reports. Moreover, determinants are 
selected based on the thesis’s scope and limitation. Therefore, there are only five 
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chosen characteristics; namely, growth rate, profitability, firm’s size, liquidity and 
interest coverage ratio. 
As the five determinants mentioned above will be discussed in the empirical part, 
Chapter 3 serves as the theoretical framework. Firstly, Chapter 3 introduces these 
determinants. Secondly, it presents their relationships to capital structure based on 
the conclusions of various studies. As shall be seen in the next sections, a 
determinant’s relationship can be concluded differently due to the fact that 
previous studies employed different methodologies, measured with different 
proxies for leverage and firm characteristics, and implemented in different time 
period (Harris & Raviv 1991, 41). Lastly, few notable unselected determinants are 
explained shortly for the purpose of reading comprehension. 
3.1 Growth Opportunity 
Theoretically, growth opportunity negatively relates with the firm’s capital 
structure. Particularly, growth rate indicates a high equity financing and a low 
debt financing. On the one hand, firms with low, negative growth rate, tend to 
employ debt to limit agency costs of managerial discretion and discipline the 
firm’s managerial attitudes (Jensen 1986). On the other hand, using leverage 
means increasing the debt’s agency cost. This cost causes two issues, firstly, it 
increases the overall cost of capital, and secondly, it transfers the wealth from 
stockholders to debtholders since the stockholders bear this agency cost. 
Therefore, high-growth firms may not issue debt to pursue their investments, 
particularly the firms with high leverage (Myer 1977).  
This theoretical assumption is supported by many empirical works (Booth et al. 
2001; Kim & Sorensen 1986; Rajan & Zingales 1995; Wald 1999). However, 
there are several dissents, notably Kester proves the opposite direction (Kester 
1986). Different conclusions partly may result from different proxies employed to 
examine the growth rate. Growth opportunity’s definition can be as a five-year 
average of sales growth (Wald 1999), market-to-book ration of equity (Booth et 
al. 2001) or Tobin’s Q (Rajan & Zingales 1995). 
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3.2 Profitability 
Wald suggests that profitability is the most significant determinant of capital 
structure leverage, and its effect is considered the largest (Wald 1999). According 
to trade-off theory, profitable firms should implement high leverage to exploit the 
tax deductibility of interest paid on debt. Furthermore, high profitability 
apparently leads to the increase in lenders and agents ‘rating (Rajan & Zingales 
1995). According to agency cost theory, firms with high profitability imply that 
there are high free cash flows. Therefore, high leverage should be employed to 
discipline management attitudes, ensure that managers pay out profits. (Jensen 
1986.) Overall, they suggest a positive dependence between leverage and 
profitability. However, pecking order proposes an opposite direction. With the 
effect of asymmetric information, firms prioritize using retained earnings (Myers 
1984; Meyers & Majluf 1984). In practice, firms with high, stable profitability 
like Microsoft, Intel tend to have low debt leverage. 
A majority of empirical studies approves that profitability significantly and 
negatively determines the firm’s capital structure. Evidence can be found in 
national degree, i.e., United States firms (Friend & Lang 1988; Titman & Wessels 
1988), Japanese firms (Kester 1986), international scope (Rajan & Zingales 1995), 
developing countries (Booth et al. 2011), and developed countries (Wald 1999). 
Differently, Long and Malitz (1985) reported a positive relationship between 
leverage and profitability, however, the statistical evidence was weak (Harris and 
Raviv 1991).The proxy to define firm’s profitability is also various in previous 
works. Some possible proxies can be the operating income over sales (Titman & 
Wessels 1988) or return on assets (ROA) (Karadeniz et al. 2009). 
3.3 Firm’s size 
Several studies nominated firm’s size as a determinant of capital structure (Booth 
et al. 2001). From the trade-off theory’s viewpoint, the firm’s size should have a 
positive relationship with the firm’s leverage. Since bigger firms have well-
diversified portfolio, less risks and thus larger borrowing capacity, they suffer less 
from costs of financial distress (Rajan & Zingales 1995). Therefore, larger firms 
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have more benefits of leverage. On the contrary, pecking order theory suggests an 
opposite conclusion. Due to asymmetric information, smaller firms have lower 
credit rating to convince lenders; therefore, external capital like debt appears to be 
costly. Meanwhile, the larger firms have an advantage of high, credible rating and 
they provide more information to lenders and outside investors. As the result, they 
suffer less from asymmetric information problems, hence, debt appear to be less 
than that of smaller firms. 
Empirically, many studies approved this positive relationship (Booth et al. 2001; 
Rajan & Zingales 1995; Wald 1999). While few dissented, however, the evidence 
was insignificant (Kester 1986; Titman & Wessels 1988). Furthermore, the firm’s 
size can be defined differently such as: total assets logarithm (Mouamer 2011), net 
sales adjusted by inflation rate (Karadeniz et al. 2009) or alternatively net sales 
logarithm and quick ratio (Titman & Wessel 1988). 
3.4 Liquidity 
Liquidity ratio can give different signals to different audience. From the viewpoint 
of institutional investors, it signals a negative situation that firms may be dealing 
with problems in terms of long-term opportunities. Furthermore, high liquidity 
ratio can be interpreted pessimistically as too much “free” cash, or remaining 
unsettled accounts receivable that can turn to bad debt. Differently, high liquidity 
signals a low default risk in paying short-term obligations for the firm. Since it 
has many liquid assets, which can be quickly converted to cash, high liquidity 
firms can borrow easier by pledging its assets to fund future investments or to 
fulfill debt obligations. (Brigham & Houston 2007, 87-88.) 
Therefore, firms with high liquidity ratios appear to have low default risk, they 
can employ high leverage depending on the level of liquidity ratio. Accordingly, it 
suggests that liquidity ratio has positive relationship with firm’s leverage 
(Karadeniz et al. 2009). Differently, there is a debate for a negative relationship 
between them. Firstly, high liquidity ratio can signal a poor performance with 
unsettled accounts receivable, which likely turns into bad debt. Secondly, as short-
term debt also has its own agency cost, when the level of this agency cost is high, 
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lenders can refuse or limit the borrowing amount of the firm (Myers & Rajan 
1998). 
Liquidity ratios include current ratio (CR) and quick, or acid test, ratio (QR). 
Current ratio is calculated as dividing firm’s total current assets by its total current 
liabilities. 
               
              
                   
 
 
Amongst these two, quick ratio is the better indicator. This is because, although a 
high level of inventory can increase the current assets of the firm, it does not 
contribute to the firm’s liquidity. In other words, since inventory is considered as 
the least liquid asset, it is advisable to leave inventory out of the calculation to 
measure more accurately the liquidity of the firm.  (Brigham & Houston 2007, 87-
88.) 
             
                        
                   
 
Therefore, quick ratio can represent the firm’s liquidity to test the relationship 
between the firm’s liquidity and its leverage. 
3.5 Interest coverage ratio 
Interest coverage ratio or times-interest-earned ratio (TIE) indicates how strong 
the operating income of a firm can cover its annual interest expenditures (Brigham 
& Houston 2007, 94). 
                         
    
                
 
As mentioned earlier, firms using debt, particularly short-term debt, always face 
the default risk. Failure to fulfill interest obligation can cause legal actions against 
the firm and, at worst, firm’s bankruptcy. In the creditor’s aspect, firms with high 
TIE can borrow capital easier than those without. 
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Theoretically, interest coverage ratio is negatively correlated with firm’s leverage 
(Harris & Raviv 1988). Particularly, high level of debt implies a large amount of 
fixed interest payments, thus, greater chance of default. Ceteris paribus, TIE ratio 
would be low in this case. On the other hand, high TIE ratio likely indicates a low 
debt ratio. 
This determinant can be expressed more accurately by earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) coverage ratio (Brigham & Dave 
2007). It is because EBITDA coverage ratio involves depreciation and 
amortization, two components of firm’s cash flow which are not cash charges. 
Therefore, EBITDA coverage ratio reflects more accurately how strong the firm’s 
operating profit can fulfill annual interest and other financial expenses. (Brigham 
& Dave 2007, 258.) 
                 
                     
                                                 
 
However, due to the huge statistic workload, the previous interest coverage ratio 
is selected in the thesis’s empirical part. 
3.6 Other determinants 
This section aims to mention a few determinants, which are noteworthy from the 
author’s viewpoint. The reason is that these elements also belong to the firm’s 
characteristics and play a crucial part in capital structure decisions. Specifically, 
various studies approved their significant associations with capital structure. 
However, including them in the thesis’s empirical part requires a huger workload 
as well as a larger database to observe. Thus, in the scope of a bachelor thesis, it is 
advisable to only mention these determinants and results of some noteworthy 
studies. 
Volatility 
A firm with high volatility of earnings appears to have many troubles, i.e., high 
business risk and high default risk. Many authors approved that the optimal 
capital structure can help managers decrease the level of volatility (Titman & 
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Wessels 1988). Furthermore, some empirical studies pointed out the negative 
correlation between volatility and the firm’s leverage (Bradley et al. 1984; Friend 
& Lang 1988), while, some against that conclusion (Kim & Sorense 1986). 
Tangibility 
Tangibility refers to the level of fixed assets over firm’s total assets. These 
tangible assets are also defined as property, plants and equipment. Due to their 
nature, they are hardly converted into cash. However, high level of fixed assets 
indicates that creditors are guaranteed for repayment as these assets can be 
collateral, particularly in case of bankruptcy. Furthermore, fixed assets increase 
tax deductions for depreciation. Therefore, the more fixed assets, the more non-
debt tax shield (Bevan & Danbolt 2002).  
Theoretically, tangibility has a positive relationship with capital structure (Harris 
& Raviv 1988). This assumption is confirmed by the following studies: (Friend & 
Lang 1988; Wald 1999; Rajan & Zingales 1995). 
Non-debt Tax Shields 
Non-debt tax shields refer to non-debt tax deductions for such as depreciation, 
investment tax credits, corporate taxes and personal taxes (DeAngelo & Masulis 
1980). These non-debt tax deductions can serve as substitutes for the firm’s tax 
benefits of debt, thus, firms can choose to use less debt to limit its negative 
effects. Theoretically, non-debt tax shields negatively associate with capital 
structure (DeAngelo & Masulis 1980; Myers & Majluf 1984). Empirically, some 
studies confirm this assumption (Kim & Sorensen 1986; Titman & Wessels 1988), 
while, some opposite it (Bradley et al. 1984). 
 
Industry Leverage Ratio 
As mentioned, firms within a specific industry tend to have more similar capital 
structure patterns than those in different fields. Many studies suggest that, firms 
should adjust their leverage ratio based on the industry average ratio. Table 2 
displays parts of the Harris and Raviv’s summary of the industry’s characteristics 
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obtained from studies of Bradley (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), Kester (1986) 
and Bowen (1982). (Harris & Raviv 1991, 40.) 
TABLE 2. Industry average capital structure (source: Harris & Raviv 1991, 40) 
 
Industry Bradley et 
al. 1984 
Bowen et 
al. 1982 
Long & 
Matlitz 1985 
Kester 
1986 
Drugs Low - Low Low 
Electronics Low - Low Low 
Machinery Low - - Medium 
Food Low - - Low 
Construction Medium - - - 
Chemicals Medium Medium - High 
Lumber Medium - - - 
Paper Medium High - High 
Telephone High - - - 
Steel High Low High High 
Electric Utilities High - - - 
Airlines High - - - 
Retail Grocery Stores High Medium - - 
 
 
As shown above, the previous studies proposed different conclusions about 
industry average leverage. This is because different approaches were employed in 
different time as well as these studies were conducted in different circumstances. 
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3.7 Summary of determinants’ correlations with capital structure  
Table 3, derived from Harris and Raviv’s Table IV: determinants of leverage, 
presents a summary of the relationships between the determinants explained in 
Chapter 3 and firm’s leverage (Harris & Raviv 1991, 41). It describes the results 
given by these capital structure studies, namely, Bradley (1984) (BLY), 
Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) (CN), Friend and Hasbrouck (1988), Friend & 
Lang (1988) (FHL), Gonedes (1988) (GO), Long and Malitz (1985) (LM), Kester 
(1986) (KE), Kim and Sorensen (1986) (KS), Marsh (1982) (Mar.), and, Titman 
and Wessels (1988) (TW).  (Harris & Raviv 1991, 41.) 
TABLE 3. Summary of determinants' relationships (source: Harris and Raviv 
1991, 41) 
 
Characteristics BLY CN FHL GO LM KE KS Mar. TW 
Growth  -*    + -  -* 
Profitability   - -* +* -   - 
Size  -* +*   -* -* + -* 
Tangibility   + + +   + +* 
Non-debt tax shield + +     -  -* 
Volatility -  -   -* +  -* 
 
* shows that the result was statistically insignificant different from zero at 
conventional significance levels or its non-statistical sense was weak 
 
Liquidity ratio and interest coverage ratio are not included in this summary. Since 
studies about these two determinants are few, the author includes them to the 
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empirical part, together with growth rate, profitability and size. The purpose is to 
clarify their relationships with capital structure and contribute to the existing 
capital structure theories. 
Nevertheless, Chapter 3 establishes the framework of the thesis’s empirical 
research. As clearly introduced, these determinants are proved to have correlations 
with capital structure. However, there are still debates in how they affect the 
firm’s capital structure decisions. As mentioned earlier, the conclusions are 
subject to many aspects, i.e., the employed methodology, the implementing period 
and the determinant measurement methods. Thus, the next Chapter 4 will focus 
more on the data processing employed in this thesis. In particular, it consists of 
this thesis’s data measurement, the estimate model and hypotheses. 
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4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The study examines the listed firms in Helsinki Technology sector, particularly, 
the index HX9000GI over a period of 2008-2012. However, not all of the listed 
firms are involved in this empirical research due to two reasons: the unavailability 
of financial data and the discontinuous listing in OMX Helsinki Exchange over 
the period of 2008-2012. Although there are actually 18 firms listed in the index, 
only 17 are eligible. 
In detail, financial reports during this five-year period are collected to obtain 
necessary financial figures of the firms. Then, the data will be transformed into 
variable’s data through calculation presented in Section 4.1. The variable’s data is 
classified based on the following independent variables introduced in Chapter 3: 
growth rate, firm’s size, liquidity, interest coverage ratio and profitability. This 
data serves a purpose of testing the correlations between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable of the analysis - capital structure. Thus, hypotheses of 
expected correlations are introduced in Section 4.2. Finally, the model for testing 
hypotheses is presented in Section 4.3. 
4.1 Measurement of Variables 
This section displays all five chosen determinants and capital structure in the form 
of variables. Firstly, DR or the firm’s debt ratio is defined as the ratio of total debt 
over total assets of the firm. As Finnish firms commonly publish their equity ratio, 
debt ratio can also be deduced from that figure. Secondly, G, which represents the 
firm’s growth rate, is defined as the percentage of change in net sales in two 
consecutive years, i.e., 2007-2008. Thirdly, SIZE, which refers to the firm’s size, 
is defined as the total net sales of the firm during a year. The higher sales a firm 
earn, the larger it is considered. Fourthly, LQ or the firm’s liquidity is defined as 
the quick ratio, or acid test. It is measured by dividing the firm’s current assets 
without inventory by its current liabilities. Fifthly, INCOV, the firm’s interest 
coverage ratio, is calculated by dividing earnings before taxes and interest (EBIT) 
by annual interest. Lastly, NI, which indicates the firm’s net profitability, is 
obtained from the financial reports. 
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TABLE 4. Summary of determinants' measurement 
 
Variables Definition Measurement 
DR Debt ratio     
         
            
 
G 
Growth Rate 
Growth Opportunities 
                       
SIZE The firm’s size                
LQ 
Liquidity ratio 
Quick ratio 
    
                        
                   
 
INCOV Interest ratio coverage        
    
               
 
NI 
Net income 
Net profit 
              
 
In short, Table 7 summarizes the definitions and measurement of the chose five 
determinants. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
As different conclusions were drawn from both theoretical studies and empirical 
results in Chapter 3, the analysis creates the hypotheses relying on the opinion of 
the majority. These hypotheses in this analysis are listed in Table 8. 
Firstly, the firm’s size positively correlates with its debt ratio. This is because a 
big firm has more diversified profile, and thereby carries less risk. Moreover, 
these large firms can easier convince the creditors due to their highly reliable 
image. Secondly, there should be a negative relationship between the firm’s 
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liquidity and its debt ratio. This is simply because the more debt the firm carries, 
the lower its liquidity is. A firm’s liquidity signals how well the firm can repay its 
current liabilities. Furthermore, higher liquidity implies a high level of current 
assets, which can be liquidated for further borrowing or investments.  
Thirdly, interest coverage ratio (INCOV) is believed to negatively correlate with 
the firm’s debt ratio. INCOV indicates not only how many times the firm’s 
earnings can cover its annual interest paid on debt, but also the level of default 
risk the firm bear. Since employing high level of debt results in the increase in 
default risk, a high debt ratio implies a low interest coverage ratio. 
TABLE 5. Summary of hypotheses 
 
Variables Hypothesis: There is a (….) relationship with 
capital structure. 
SIZE Positive ( + ) 
LQ Positive ( + ) 
INCOV Negative ( - ) 
G Negative ( - ) 
NI Negative ( - ) 
 
 
Fourthly, there is a negative relationship between the firm’s profitability and its 
debt ratio. Since retained earnings are the internal and safer source to use, highly 
profitable firms tend to have low debt ratio thanks to the use of retained earnings. 
Lastly, growth opportunities are expected to have a negative relationship with 
debt ratio. Low-growth firms tend to use more debt to force its management to 
perform effectively while high-growth firms avoid using debt because of its 
agency costs. 
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4.3 The Model 
The data used for this thesis is comprised of financial information of 17 firms 
during the period of 2008-2012. The nature of this data is cross-sectional and time 
series, which is also called the panel data. Therefore, it is feasible to employ panel 
data analysis due to two reasons. Firstly, this analytical method is widely used by 
social scientists because it provides the inclusion of data for N cross-sections, i.e., 
firms, individuals, organizations, and the T time period, i.e., years, quarters, 
months. Secondly, panel data analysis is preferred when examining the impacts of 
various variables on a particular dependent variable. (Asteriou & Hall 2011, 416.) 
A simple model for panel analysis can be given as follow:       
                        
Where y stands for the dependent variable, x is for the independent variable, 
while, α and β are two coefficients, i and t represents individuals and time and 
error term    (Asteriou & Hall 2011, 417). Panel data analysis involves three main 
approaches: common constant, random effect and fixed effect. 
Common constant 
In the common constant method,    is set equally for all the firms. In particular, it 
implies that all the examined firms have no difference and the data set is a priori 
homogeneous. However, the common constant is believed to be limited due to the 
fact that it does not concern the involvement of fixed and random effects in its 
estimation. (Asteriou & Hall 2011, 417.) 
Fixed Effect model 
Being different from the common constant, fixed effect model concerns all 
specific effects that, firstly, belong only to a particular firm, and secondly, do not 
change over time. Furthermore, it allows different constants for different cross-
section groups (Asteriou & Hall 2011, 419). The fixed effect model can be 
illustrated as follow: 
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This method is traditionally employed for data sets where the number of firms is 
huge. Therefore, although it is crucial fundamental model, sometimes there is a 
need to simplify the estimation. As the result, it leads to another alternative 
approach, which is random effect model. (Asteriou & Hall 2011, 419.) 
Random effect model 
The main difference between fixed effect model and random effect model is that 
random effect model considers all the specific effects which are not fixed, but 
rather random. Therefore, the model of random effect model is given as follow 
(Asteriou & Hall 2011, 420). 
                                                
Or the equation can be rewritten as follow: 
                                               
Where vi equals to a zero mean standard random variable. The use of this model, 
firstly, equalizes all the value for all individuals from the same group and 
secondly, it creates a simpler estimation than that of the fixed effect model. 
However, random effect model requires more specific assumptions; otherwise, the 
results will be invalid or biased. (Asteriou & Hall 2011, 420.) 
Fundamentally, these two models proposed different assumptions. Fixed effect 
model considers that each firm varies due to its intercept term, whereas random 
effect model estimates that each firm differs in its error term. (Asteriou & Hall 
2011, 420.)  
Hausman Test 
In order to know which model is more appropriate, a method called the Hausman 
test is employed. However, due to the complex of the test, only its result is 
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presented in the thesis to identify which model is more appropriate (Hausman 
1978). 
In this empirical research, only the fixed effect and the random effect models are 
tested; and the Hausman test will define which finding should be used. In term of 
the estimate model, DR represents the dependent variable, which is supposed to 
get impacts from the change of independent variables, namely, SIZE, LQ, 
INCOV, G and NI. Therefore, the model is estimated as follow: 
                                             
                             +     
 
In this model, i represents a specific firm in the list, while, t expresses the time. 
For example, DRi,t  illustrates the firm i’s debt ratio at the time t. Particularly,  
DR Nokia 2008 means the debt ratio of Nokia Oyj at the end of year 2008. Overall, 
there are 80 observations in the period of 2008-2012.  
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5 AN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: OMX HELSINKI TECHNOLOGY INDEX  
HX9000GI 
Chapter 5 presents an empirical research of OMX Helsinki Technology Sector 
which is represented by an index of 17 Finnish technology firms. It aims to clarify 
the relationships between the chosen determinants of Chapter 3 and the capital 
structure. Thus, the research adapts the proposed model and the database 
constructed in Chapter 4 to test the hypotheses.  
As the result, Chapter 5 firstly introduces the OMX Helsinki Technology sector in 
Section 5.1. In particular, the background information of the listed firms is 
presented. Secondly, in Section 5.2, the data input process is briefly illustrated. 
Thirdly, Section 5.3 presents the results as well as explanations. Additionally, it 
implies that the answer for the main research question is given in this section. 
5.1 OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange 
The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. is one of the world’s largest exchange 
companies. NASDAQ OMX provides trading, exchange technology to firms and 
investors as well as public company services. In addition, it operates in 26 
markets with about 3,300 listed firms and earns $7 trillion in market capital.  The 
total amount of indexes that NASDAQ OMX has in its database is about 27,000. 
The Helsinki Stock Exchange, also called NASDAG OMX Helsinki, belongs to 
NASDAQ OMX Nordic which also operates in Copenhagen, Stockholm, Iceland, 
Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. (OMX, NASDAG.) 
The NASDAG OMX Helsinki consists of all 132 public listed companies on the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange. It intends to illustrate the current situation as well as 
reflect any changes in Helsinki stock exchange. It can be either OMXH (OMX 
Helsinki All-Share) or OMXHCAP (OMX Helsinki Cap Index), available both as 
PI (Price index) and GI (Gross index). The base date applied for OMXH and 
OMXHCAP is December 28, 1990 with the base value began at EUR 1000. 
(NASDAQ OMX Nordic.) 
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Furthermore, NASDAG OMX Helsinki provides various indexes which classify 
132 listed firms according to their industries and supersectors. Among those, 
OMX Helsinki Technology or HX9000 represents the Finnish technology sector 
index.  
OMX Helsinki Technology 
Index HX9000, available in both HX9000GI and HX9000PI, includes 18 selected 
technology firms based on the Industry Classification Benchmark. Table 6 
illustrates in detail which subsectors involve in HX9000GI or HX9000PI.  
TABLE 6. Technology Industry Classification Benchmark  
 (source: FTSE International Limited) 
 
Industry Supersector Sector Subsector 
9000 
Technology 
9500 
Technology 
9530 
Software & 
Computer Services 
9533 Computer Services 
9535 Internet 
9537 Software 
 
9570 Technology 
Hardware & 
Equipment 
9572 Computer Hardware 
9574 Electronic Office 
Equipment 
9576 Semiconductors 
9578 
Telecommunications 
Equipment 
 
 
This index serves as the main database for the empirical work. Specifically, 
financial reports are collected from the listed firms in the index; and then variables 
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are deduced from the firms’ financial figures. Therefore, it implies that these firms 
will represent the whole Finnish technology industry to test the validity of the 
chosen determinants. However, as mentioned earlier, only 17 firms are included in 
this analysis due to the selecting criteria. Information about these firms is 
introduced shortly in Appendix 1. 
5.2 Firm Data Input 
Financial data from the firms is obtained from two financial statements: income 
statement and balance sheet. In the firm’s income statements, EBIT, interest 
expense, revenue and net profit figures are collected. Besides, data of the firm’s 
current liabilities, current assets, and inventory are derived from the balance 
sheets.  
 
FIGURE 4. An example of data input, Affecto OYJ 
 
Furthermore, the firm’s annual reports provide the firm’s equity ratio. After that, 
obtained financial data is measured and transformed into variables’ data according 
to time-series and cross-section (See Table 4 for measurement method). Then, the 
panel data is transferred to the database of EVIEWS. This software provides many 
Balance Sheet 2011 2012
Revenue 127270 133400
EBIT 8182 10451
interest 1691 1199
Net profit 5328 7552
Income Statement 2011 2012
Equity ratio (%) 46,1 50,6
Current assets 62405 65937
Inventory 402 317
Current liabilites 52670 53263
Debt ratio (%) 53,9 49,4
Quick ratio 1,177 1,232
Interest coverage ratio 4,839 8,716
Growth 0,116 0,048
Size 127270 133400
Year Company DR QR INCOV GROWTH SIZE (TEUR) NI (TEUR)
2011 AF 53,9 1,177 4,839 11,6 127270 5328
2012 AF 49,4 1,232 8,716 4,8 133400 7552
Firm’s Data  
Variable’s Data  
EVIEWS Data  
Affecto OYJ  
Income Statement Balance Sheet 
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econometric tools that can easily combine the data collected and the proposed 
models in Chapter 4 for analyzing. An example of the data input process is 
described above in Figure 4. 
Through the EVIEWs program and the constructed database, the fixed effect 
model and the random effect model will be examined. Furthermore, a Hausman 
test will be implemented to compare the accuracy of these models. As the result, 
in the next Section 5.3, the results of these two models provided by EVIEWS 
program are explained. 
5.3 Findings 
Firstly, the result of the fixed effect model is shown on Table 7. (See Appendix 2 
for the full report) 
TABLE 7. Independent variables' effects on dependent variable using fixed effect 
   model 
 
Variable Coefficient Relationship 
Probability 
(Prob.) 
Result 
(Prob. > 0.05 = 
insignificant) 
G 0.007765 + 0.7152 Insignificant 
INCOV 0.012849 + 0.5692 Insignificant 
NI -0.000241 - 0.0000 Significant 
SIZE -5.72E-06 - 0.8559 Insignificant 
LQ -11.40939 - 0.0000 Significant 
R-Squared 0.920759 F-Statistic 34.27802 
 
*Note: Dependent variable: DR; Method: Least Squares GLS cross-section weights; EVIEWS 7 
 
In particular, variable G has a positive coefficient (0.007765) with DR. However, 
its probability (0.7152) is bigger than the significant level (0.05); it implies the 
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insignificancy in variable G’s result. Similarly, variable INCOV has a positive 
coefficient (0.012849), but its probability (0.5692) rejects the result. Furthermore, 
although SIZE has a negative correlation (-5.72E-06) with DR, its conclusion is 
not confirmed due to high probability (0.8559). Meanwhile, the other two, LQ and 
NI are reported to have significant results since their probabilities, both 0.0000, 
are lower than the significant level (0.05). Thus, their negative coefficient – 
respectively -0.000241 and -11.40939 - are confirmed in this approach. Besides, 
this approach achieves 92% (0.92) in R-squared and 34.27 in F-statistic. It means 
that, this model has high explanatory power and its result is reliable. 
Secondly, the analysis continues with the result of the random effect model 
illustrated in Table 8. (See Appendix 3 for the full report) 
TABLE 8. Independent variables' effects using random effect model 
 
Variable Coefficient Relationship 
Probability 
(Prob.) 
Result 
(Prob. > 0.05 = 
insignificant) 
G -0.003978 - 0.9142 Insignificant 
INCOV 0.010529 + 0.6076 Insignificant 
NI -0.000236 - 0.0108 Significant 
SIZE 1.14E-05 + 0.0396 Significant 
LQ -11.19470 - 0.0000 Significant 
R-squared 0.507515 F-Statistic 15.25167 
 
*Note: Dependent Variable: DR Method: Panel GLS (Cross-section random effects): Swamy and 
Arora estimator of component variances; EVIEWS 7. 
 
In this approach’s result, variable G has a negative coefficient (-0.003978), 
however, its probability (0.9142) is much higher than the significant level of 0.05. 
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Thus, its result is insignificant. Meanwhile, INCOV’s positive relationship 
(0.010529) is also rejected due to insignificant probability level (0.6076). 
Whereas, SIZE is reported to have significant positive coefficient (1.14E-05) as its 
probability (0.0396) is lower than the 0.05 level. Besides, negative correlations of 
NI and LQ are confirmed since their probabilities are also lower than the 0.05 
level. Additionally, this approach is reported with 50.7% in R-squared and 15.2 in 
F-statistics. This implies that, although it just exceeds the required level of R-
squared (50% as acceptable), this approach is reliable and its result has a high 
explanatory power. 
Since the two models only conflict in whether SIZE has positive effect on the 
firm’s capital structure, the author uses the Hausman test to see which result is 
more appropriate. The result of the Hausman test is indicated in Table 9. 
 
TABLE 9. Hausman Test 
 
          
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
          
Cross-section random 6.071884 5 0.2993 
          
 
*Note: Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test; Test cross-section random effects; EVIEWS 7 
 
 
In the Hausman test, the null hypothesis states that random effect model is 
appropriate, while, the alternative hypothesis indicates the fixed effect model. If 
the probability of the Hausman test is lower than 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Whereas, if the probability is higher than 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
accepted. In Table 9, with the test’s probability of 0.2993, the random effect 
model is more appropriate. Therefore, its result is valid, implying that, SIZE’s 
positive effect on DR is confirmed. 
 
According to the findings, the correlations between the firm’s size, liquidity, and 
profitability with the capital structure are confirmed. Firstly, the firm’s size has a 
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positive relationship with the debt ratio. Since bigger firms possess bigger 
borrowing capacity as well as more credible image, they tend to employ higher 
debt leverage. Secondly, profitability negatively correlates with the capital 
structure. Firms with high profitability, usually finance with retained earnings 
first. Accordingly, well-performing firms often set their debt leverage low. 
Thirdly, firms with high liquidity tend to have lower debt ratio due to the fact that, 
high liquidity ratio can signal unsettled accounts receivable, which likely turns 
into bad debt. Furthermore, high liquidity implies a high level of current assets, 
i.e., cash and equivalents, thus, they tend to maintain high cash inflows. As the 
result, they prefer using all of their internal sources before starting funding with 
debt. Lastly, the other two determinants, growth rate and interest coverage ratio, 
have no significant results within the scope of this analysis.  
 
TABLE 10. The main research question's answer 
 
Finnish technology firms’ characteristics How they affect capital structure 
Size Positive 
Liquidity Negative 
Profitability Negative 
Growth rate Insignificant/ Irrelevant 
Interest coverage capability Insignificant/ Irrelevant 
 
Additionally, the answer for the main research question can be derived from the 
results above. Since the main question is “How Finnish technology firms’ 
characteristics affect their capital structure decisions? “, its purpose is to find out 
the relationships between firm characteristics and the capital structure. Table 10 
gives the whole answer for the main research question. In short, the Finnish 
technology firms’ capital structure is influenced by their firm’s size, liquidity and 
profitability. 
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6. SUMMARY 
The principles of capital structure presented in Chapter 2 indicate that there is no 
universal theory concerning this topic. In fact, all theories are essential and 
complementary to each other. Therefore, combining all the principles is the most 
feasible way to describe the power of debt leverage and the capital structure’s 
relationship with the firm’s value. The principles of capital structure also imply 
the tradeoff between negative and positive effects in capital structure decisions.  
Firstly, on the one hand, a firm’s business and financial risks naturally occur with 
the firm’s operation. Both of them increase the firm’s riskiness, hence, increase 
WACC. On the other hand, operating leverage and financial leverage offset the 
negative effects of these two risks by amplifying the range of the firm’s 
profitability. These four factors not only relate to each other, but also determine 
the optimal capital structure. Secondly, interest tax shelters are the main gain of 
debt leverage. However, it also raises the firm’s costs of financial distress and 
agency costs. Tradeoff theory suggests that the optimal capital structure is the 
equilibrium where the changes of gains and losses are equal. Thirdly, asymmetric 
information plays a crucial role in a firm’s funding decisions. It explains further 
how firms favor internal finance sources like retained earnings, and suggests the 
firm’s priority order of funding sources. Lastly, debt can help boost up and 
discipline the firm’s management. But then, it creates conflicts between 
stockholders and managers or creditors.  
Many studies reported the effect of capital structure and pointed out the capital 
structure’s determinants. However, they concluded differently in which direction 
these determinants influence the capital structure. Chapter 3 provides firstly an 
overview of some selected noticeable determinants, and then, discussions of how 
they affect the firm’s debt ratio. The selected determinants are growth rate, firm’s 
size, interest coverage ratio, firm’s profitability and liquidity. These factors have 
been concluded differently from many previous studies due to different methods, 
different time periods and determinant measurements that those studies 
implemented. Therefore, Chapter 3 establishes the framework for the empirical 
analysis of the determinants’ relationships with capital structure. In particular, 
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these chosen determinants are examined for the validity of previous explained 
theories within a specific condition. 
The examination takes place within the scope of the Finnish technology industry. 
Chapter 4 provides the analysis of determinants’ effects on capital structure based 
on the financial database collected from 17 firms listed in the index HX9000GI, 
OMX Helsinki Technology Sector. In short, the database includes 80 observations 
within a period of 2008-2012 and it is examined using panel data analysis. The 
estimated model is established and two possible approaches, the fixed effect 
model and the random effect model are implemented. Finally, according to the 
Hausman test, the result from the random effect model is accepted. 
According to the findings of the thesis, the validity of the effect of a firm’s size, 
profitability and liquidity, on capital structure is confirmed. Particularly, the 
firm’s size positively correlates with capital structure, while, the firm’s 
profitability and liquidity have negative relationships with the capital structure. 
Additionally, the effect of growth rate and interest coverage ratio on the firm’s 
capital structure is not proved within the circumstance of the Finnish Technology 
industry. 
Concerning the reliability and validity of a quantitative study, these factors play a 
crucial part in evaluating the accuracy of the finding. Firstly, reliability indicates 
that the finding should be consistent over time and repeatedly examined. 
Secondly, validity implies that the findings must be obtained according to the 
method of scientific research. Furthermore, it examines whether the research 
encompasses the entire experimental concept that it should. Reliability usually 
acts as the consequence of the validity in quantitative research. (Golafshani 2003, 
600-604.) 
The author believes that the findings are reliable and valid due to two reasons. 
First of all, this basic framework is supported by many academic studies. The 
author studied the annual reported financial figures within the scope of 17 firms 
and gave the result based on the widely-used estimate model. Second, this 
research is experimental and archival, meaning that the finding is not affected by 
any uncertainties. Within the scope of the research, the result is fixed as long as 
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the database stays reliable. However, there are some noticeable weaknesses. The 
research partly selects different measurement of determinants; therefore, the 
finding can change if future studies employ other methods.  Furthermore, as 
mentioned earlier, the sample is quite small. Therefore, the finding might be 
slightly insignificant compared to previous studies. Fortunately, within the 
requirement of a bachelor’s thesis, these weaknesses do not noticeably affect the 
reliability and the validity of the thesis. 
Regarding further research recommendation, as proved earlier, capital structure is 
a relatively large topic to be completely covered since its theories vary depending 
on market or industry’s uniqueness and the firm itself. Furthermore, the capital 
structure’s determinants are also subject to which conditions the firm is in. 
Therefore, there is a variety of options to choose from for further research. The 
first possible option is to examine the effect of a number of determinants in a 
specific industry, i.e., tourism, paper, chemicals or market as a whole. Another 
suggestion is to identify the difference in capital structure decisions within two or 
more groups of firms. Besides, it is also possible to study optimal capital structure 
in a specific firm or industry. 
 Below are few examples of further research suggested by the author: 
 How firm characteristics affect capital structure decisions: An analysis of 
Finnish Market. 
 How firm characteristics affect capital structure decisions: An analysis of 
Finnish Paper Industry ( or a specific industry) 
 Optimal capital structure: Comparison between Finnish public listed and 
private firms 
 Optimal capital structure: Comparison between Finnish and German (or a 
specific country) technology industries. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1.  HX9000GI index – Listed firms (NASDAQ OMX Nordic) 
 
Company Description Stock 
symbol 
1. QPR Software Oyj 
Corporate Performance Management 
software 
Related consulting services 
QPR1V 
2. SSH Com Security 
SSH protocol, data-in-transit security 
solutions 
Information Assurance Platform 
SSH1V 
3. Solteg Oyj 
IT solutions and services to retail, car sales 
and selected industrial segments 
STQ1V 
4. Tecnotree Oyj 
Telecom IT solutions for the management of 
products, customers and revenue 
TEM1V 
5. Tieto Oyj IT and product engineering services TIE1V 
6. Teleste Oyj 
Video and Broadband Solutions  
Network Services 
TLT1V 
7. Trainer’s House Oyj 
Services & Solutions for boosting business 
growth. 
TRH1V 
8. Ixonos Oyj 
Communication technology service & 
consulting 
Project management & risk management 
Software production services 
XNS1V 
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APPENDIX 1. (Continue)  
Company Description Symbol 
9. Affect Oyj 
IT solutions in B2B 
Business Intelligence (BI) solutions 
AFE1V 
10. Basware Oyj 
Invoice Automation  
Purchase Management 
IFRS based Financial Management 
BAS1V 
11. Comptel Oyj 
Telecom software products 
Software licenses & related services 
CTL1V 
12. Digia Oyj 
Integrated ICT solutions 
Smartphone and mobile R&D 
Outsourcing and telecom products and services 
DIG1V 
13. Elektrobit Oyj 
Embedded software & hardware solutions for the 
automotive industry and wireless technologies. 
EBC1V 
14. F-Secure Oyj 
Anti-virus software 
Cloud content 
Computer security 
FSC1V 
15. Innofactor Plc 
Microsoft Azure-based cloud solutions 
Microsoft-environment software 
IFA1V 
16. Nokia Oyj 
Mobile devices 
Mobile services & software 
Communication network services & equipment 
NOK1V 
17. Okmetic Oyj 
tailor-made silicon wafers for sensor & 
semiconductor  
OKM1V 
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APPENDIX 2. Fixed Effect Model – Full Result from EVIEWS 7 
 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 61.65325 5.937690 10.38337 0.0000 
G 0.007765 0.021182 0.366604 0.7152 
INCOV 0.012849 0.022444 0.572477 0.5692 
NI -0.000241 4.99E-05 -4.818653 0.0000 
SIZE -5.72E-06 3.14E-05 -0.182361 0.8559 
LQ -11.40939 0.813981 -14.01677 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.920759    Mean dependent var 61.34714 
Adjusted R-squared 0.893897    S.D. dependent var 44.60611 
S.E. of regression 6.318388    Sum squared resid 2355.400 
F-statistic 34.27802    Durbin-Watson stat 2.076352 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.834408    Mean dependent var 42.96000 
Sum squared resid 2485.928    Durbin-Watson stat 2.388706 
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APPENDIX 3. Random  Effect Model – Full Result from EVIEWS 7 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 58.28091 3.112835 18.72277 0.0000 
G -0.003978 0.036777 -0.108157 0.9142 
INCOV 0.010529 0.020417 0.515698 0.6076 
NI -0.000236 9.01E-05 -2.616006 0.0108 
SIZE 1.14E-05 5.44E-06 2.094589 0.0396 
LQ -11.19470 1.377890 -8.124523 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 7.344474 0.5656 
Idiosyncratic random 6.437126 0.4344 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.507515    Mean dependent var 15.67748 
Adjusted R-squared 0.474239    S.D. dependent var 8.941710 
S.E. of regression 6.483579    Sum squared resid 3110.723 
F-statistic 15.25167    Durbin-Watson stat 1.878590 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.521088    Mean dependent var 42.96000 
Sum squared resid 7189.617    Durbin-Watson stat 0.812807 
     
  
 
    
